# Weighted Voting Systems

**Contemporary Math** 

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# Weighted Voting Systems

So far, we've seen voting methods for **electing officials**. Voting is also needed in **passing/vetoing resolutions or motions**:

#### Definition

(Resolution)

A resolution (AKA motion) is a "Yes or No" vote on a law or plan of action.

## Definition

(Weighted Voting System)

A weighted voting system with N voters is described by the following:

[(quota) : (weight of voter 1), (weight of voter 2), ..., (weight of voter N)]

 $[Q:w_1,w_2,\ldots,w_N]$ 

The **quota** is the # of voters needed in this system to get a resolution passed. The **weights** are the amount of votes controlled by voter 1, voter 2, etc... The sum of the weights is represented by W:  $W = \sum_{k=1}^{N} w_k$ 

# Dictators & Veto Power in Weighted Voting Systems

## Definition

(Dictator)

Let  $[Q: w_1, w_2, ..., w_N]$  be a weighted voting system with *N* voters. Then voter *k* is a **dictator** if voter *k* alone can pass a resolution/motion:

 $w_k \ge Q$ 

#### Definition

(Veto Power)

Let  $[Q: w_1, w_2, ..., w_N]$  be a weighted voting system with *N* voters. Then voter *k* has **veto power** if voter *k* can prevent a motion from passing:

$$W - w_k < Q$$

# Weighted Voting System (Example)

**EX 11-3-1:** Given the weighted voting system [12:1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1]

Then: the **quota** is Q = 12.

Voter 1 has weight  $w_1 = 1$  (i.e. Voter 1 has one vote) Voter 2 has weight  $w_2 = 1$  (i.e. Voter 2 has one vote)

Voter 12 has weight  $w_{12} = 1$  (i.e. Voter 12 has one vote)

The total sum of the weights is  $W = \sum_{k=1}^{12} w_k = 1 + 1 + \dots + 1 = 12$   $w_1 = 1 < 12 = Q \implies$  Voter 1 is NOT a dictator  $w_2 = 1 < 12 = Q \implies$  Voter 2 is NOT a dictator  $\vdots$   $w_{12} = 1 < 12 = Q \implies$  Voter 12 is NOT a dictator  $W - w_1 = 12 - 1 = 11 < 12 = Q \implies$  Voter 1 has veto power  $W - w_2 = 12 - 1 = 11 < 12 = Q \implies$  Voter 2 has veto power

## Weighted Voting System (Example)

**EX 11-3-2:** Given the weighted voting system [14:17,5,3,2]

Then: the **quota** is Q = 14.

Voter 1 has weight  $w_1 = 17$  (i.e. Voter 1 has 17 votes) Voter 2 has weight  $w_2 = 5$  (i.e. Voter 2 has 5 votes) Voter 3 has weight  $w_3 = 3$  (i.e. Voter 3 has 3 votes) Voter 4 has weight  $w_4 = 2$  (i.e. Voter 4 has 2 votes)

The total sum of the weights is 
$$W = \sum_{k=1}^{4} w_k = 17 + 5 + 3 + 2 = 27$$

 $\begin{array}{l} w_1 = 17 \geq 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 1 IS a dictator} \\ w_2 = 5 < 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 2 is NOT a dictator} \\ w_3 = 3 < 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 3 is NOT a dictator} \\ w_4 = 2 < 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 4 is NOT a dictator} \\ W - w_1 = 27 - 17 = 10 < 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 1 has veto power} \\ W - w_2 = 27 - 5 = 22 \geq 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 2 has NO veto power} \\ W - w_3 = 27 - 3 = 24 \geq 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 3 has NO veto power} \\ W - w_4 = 27 - 2 = 25 \geq 14 = Q \implies & \text{Voter 4 has NO veto power} \\ \end{array}$ 

# Coalitions

To better improve the chances of passing or vetoing a resolution, some members of the voting system may form a **coalition**:

### Definition

(Coalition)

A **coalition** is a group of voters who vote the same way. A **coalition's weight** is the sum of the weights of all voters in the coalition. If a coalition's weight  $\geq$  quota, then the coalition is called a **winning coalition**.

How many different coalitions are possible??

### Proposition

(Possible Coalitions)

Given a weighted voting system with N voters.

Then there are  $2^N - 1$  possible coalitions formed from the *N* voters.

<u>**REMARK:**</u> This follows from the fact that there are  $2^N$  subsets of a set with N elements, but one of those subsets is the empty set (which contains nothing).

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However, sometimes it just takes one voter of a coalition to leave the coalition in order to render the coalition ineffective in passing or vetoing a resolution:

#### Definition

(Critical Voter)

A voter in a winning coalition is **critical** if that voter were to leave the coalition, then the coalition would no longer be winning.

How can one measure the effectiveness, or power, of a voter? One way is the compute the **Banzhaf Power Index**:

#### Definition

(Banzhaf Power Index)

In a weighted voting system, a voter's Banzhaf power index is defined as

# times **the voter** is **critical** in winning coalitions Total # times **voters** are **critical** in winning coalitions

# Fin.