Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow
be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical imperative has gained a
certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced
by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that
hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of
categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical
reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of
instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against
this prevailing view both as an interpretation of Kant and as
philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it
will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that
hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical
imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning
must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative
to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while
instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it
is incoherent.
The problem of the unity of the
proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a
proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth
conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather
than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the
traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory
is successful, then there is a plausible extension that readily
solves the Frege-Geach problem for normative propositions.
Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but it does point to
significant connections between expressivism, unity and embedding.
When we receive a kindness, gratitude is owed to our benefactor.
But what does gratitude demand? Must we reciprocate the kindness or
simply acknowledge it with a “thank you”? Or, perhaps, we ought to
do both? Most theorists about gratitude believe that significant
acts of beneficence require reciprocation. In this essay, I argue
that it is acknowledgment rather than reciprocation that lies at the
core of gratitude. Relying on arguments first provided by Kant in
his Metaphysics of Morals, I will argue for the importance of
acknowledgment by articulating and defending three Kantian claims.
First, I show that beneficence is the proper object of gratitude and
gratitude is the companion obligation that acknowledges an act of
beneficence. Second, I contend that beneficence is a social practice
that depends upon the acknowledgment of its participants. In other
words, widespread ingratitude can destroy the possibility of
beneficence. Finally, I argue that in situations where reciprocation
is appropriate, it ought to be performed as a token of
acknowledgment rather than any type of “paying back”. Taking all
these claims together, acknowledgment turns out to play the central
role in gratitude’s justification and also to play the central role
in guiding actual acts of gratitude. I conclude that gratitude just
is a duty to acknowledge acts of beneficence.
The Negation Problem states that expressivism has insufficient
structure to account for the various ways in which a moral sentence
can be negated. We argue that the Negation Problem does not arise
for expressivist accounts of all normative language but arises only
for the specific examples on which expressivists usually focus. In
support of this claim, we argue for the following three theses: 1) A
problem that is structurally identical to the Negation Problem
arises in non-normative cases, and this problem is solved once the
hidden quantificational structure involved in such cases is
uncovered; 2) the terms ‘required’, ‘permissible’, and ‘forbidden’
can also be analyzed in terms of hidden quantification over a
normative primitive, and the Negation Problem disappears once this
hidden structure is uncovered; 3) the Negation Problem does not
arise for normative language that has no hidden quantificational
structure. We conclude that the Negation Problem is not really a
problem about expressivism at all but is rather a feature of the
quantificational structure of the required, permitted, and
forbidden.