General
Practical Logic in Kant's Groundwork
In the preface to the Groundwork
for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant proposes a fascinating
proportion. A
metaphysics of morals is to general practical philosophy as
transcendental
philosophy is to general logic. Using the suggested analogy to
theoretical
reason as my guide, I argue that general practical philosophy
contrasts to a
metaphysics of morals because its rules are 1) formally empty and
2)
constitutively general. It follows that a metaphysics of moral is
neither. Such
a conclusion conflicts with a modern trend in Kant scholarship
that attempts to
analytically derive substantive (i.e. formally non-empty)
practical conclusions
from general features about our agency.
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant claims that hypothetical imperatives are
analytic while categorical imperatives are synthetic. This remark
has proved puzzling since imperatives do not have the proper form
to be either analytic or synthetic. Previous attempts to
understand Kant’s claim have attempted to translate imperatives
into propositions with the correct form. In the first part of this
paper, I criticize these previous attempts. Afterwards, I propose
my own account according to which an imperative is analytic if its
validity can be discerned from rules constitutive of practical
reasoning, and it is synthetic otherwise. I defend this
interpretation by finding the very same characterization at work
in the theoretical sphere. Revisions are made both to our
understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction as well as our
understanding of imperatives.