The Determinants of State Legislator Support for Restrictive Voter ID Laws

William D. Hicks1, Seth C. McKee2, and Daniel A. Smith3

Abstract
We examine state legislator behavior on restrictive voter identification (ID) bills from 2005 to 2013. Partisan polarization of state lawmakers on voter ID laws is well known, but we know very little with respect to other determinants driving this political division. A major shortcoming of extant research evaluating the passage of voter ID bills stems from using the state legislature as the unit of analysis. We depart from existing scholarship by using the state legislator as our unit of analysis, and we cover the entirety of the period when restrictive voter ID laws became a frequent agenda item in state legislatures. Beyond the obviously significant effect of party affiliation, we find a notable relationship between the racial composition of a member’s district, region, and electoral competition and the likelihood that a state lawmaker supports a voter ID bill. Democratic lawmakers representing substantial black district populations are more opposed to restrictive voter ID laws, whereas Republican legislators with substantial black district populations are more supportive. We also find Southern lawmakers (particularly Democrats) are more opposed to restrictive voter ID legislation. In particular, we find black legislators in the South are the least supportive of restrictive voter ID bills, which is likely tied to the historical context associated with state laws restricting electoral participation. Finally, in those state legislatures where electoral competition is not intense, polarization over voter ID laws is less stark, which likely reflects the expectation that the reform will have little bearing on the outcome of state legislative contests.

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With very few exceptions, the wave of restrictive voter identification (ID) laws passed in the American states during the new millennium has been highly polarized along partisan lines. Indeed, in each instance where a state legislature has approved a more restrictive voter ID law, a greater proportion of Republican state lawmakers have supported the election reform than their Democratic counterparts, usually by wide margins. This was even true in Rhode Island, the sole case over the past decade in which a Democratic-controlled legislature introduced and championed a more restrictive voter ID measure. Although nearly two thirds of the Ocean State’s sizable Democratic majority in both the House and the Senate favored the 2011 legislation, all 16 of the Republican members voting on the final version of the bill supported it.\(^1\) In other states, there was far less bipartisan voting on the controversial legislation.

On its face, the requirement that prospective voters produce proof of identity prior to casting a ballot at the polls seems to be a reasonable, appropriate, and noncontroversial action for states wanting to safeguard the ballot box and deter fraud. Indeed, the legislation has impressive popular support. For instance, in a 2010 Rasmussen poll of likely voters, more than 80% of those surveyed, with majorities in every demographic group, supported the requirement that registered voters show poll workers a photo ID before being permitted to vote (von Spakovsky 2011).\(^2\) Nonetheless, restrictive voter ID laws in the context of contemporary American politics are anything but noncontroversial. The extreme partisan polarization exhibited by legislators in states enacting such reforms indicates that their electoral effects are expected to register unequally. Simple deduction, based on overwhelming Republican support and equally impressive Democratic opposition to restrictive voter ID legislation, leads to the obvious expectation that tightening acceptable forms of voter ID at the polls will aid Republicans and disadvantage Democrats.

In this article, we examine the determinants of state legislator support for restrictive voter ID legislation. Unlike most previous research (but see McKee 2015), we use the individual lawmaker as the unit of analysis, whereas the lion’s share of published studies examine the question of support for restrictive voter ID laws with the state legislature as the unit of analysis. Our approach allows us to consider the more context-dependent setting of state legislative districts nested within states while gaining more analytical purchase by using a lawmaker’s vote on this salient and polarizing electoral reform as the dependent variable. Beyond presenting the most comprehensive individual-level analysis of voting on restrictive voter ID laws and confirming previous findings (like the role of electoral competition), we identify an important relationship between race and region that affects the likelihood that a state legislator votes in favor of a restrictive voter ID bill.
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the literature on voter ID laws. We discuss the research designs of existing studies and how our work breaks new ground by examining state legislator voting on voter ID laws while highlighting both understudied and sometimes completely overlooked factors that shape legislator voting on this electoral reform. Then, after discussing the data we have collected for our analysis, we present our results, paying particular attention to the primary determinants that affect a lawmaker’s likelihood of supporting a restrictive voter ID law. Finally, we conclude with a brief summary of our findings and how they speak more generally about the behavior of state legislators when they are faced with voting on a salient and controversial electoral reform.

Support for Restrictive Voter ID Laws

Most scholars examining voter ID laws have focused on the question of the possible, if not realized, effects of restrictive voter ID legislation on turnout (Barreto, Nuno, and Sanchez 2009; Cobb, Greiner, and Quinn 2012; Erikson and Minnite 2009; Hood and Bullock 2012; Mycoff, Wagner, and Wilson 2009; Vercellotti and Andersen 2009). Indeed, the earliest studies focused almost entirely on the question of whether and to what extent requiring an individual to present photo ID would inhibit casting a ballot. Perhaps because this research has yielded mixed results and also because of other important questions related to this electoral reform, more recent work has turned to assessing public opinion toward voter ID laws (see Gronke et al. 2015; Wilson and Brewer 2013) and the factors shaping state legislative support of these measures (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Hicks et al. 2015; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014). In this article, we consider the determinants of state legislator support for restrictive voter ID laws, but in doing so, we depart from extant studies evaluating the motivation behind such restrictive laws in three important ways.

First, we eschew the macrolevel approach disproportionately favored in recent studies, where the state legislature is the unit of analysis (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Biggers and Hanmer 2013; Hicks et al. 2015; Rocha and Matsubayashi 2014). Much has been gleaned from these aggregate-level assessments, especially the broad electoral context of a state and how competition shapes voting on restrictive voter ID legislation. By contrast, we focus instead on state lawmakers, arguing that district-based factors—the local context of legislative decision making, including the racial composition, education level, and other demographic characteristics of a member’s district—may have a significant effect on legislator voting behavior when members are presented with the opportunity in their chamber to support a restrictive voter ID bill. Narrowing the lens from state-level votes on voter ID bills to the votes of individual lawmakers within a state in a given year brings into sharper focus the influence of a member’s own electoral connection.

Second, moving beyond district-level influences on lawmaker vote choice on this salient issue, we also assess how the race of lawmakers, their region, as well as electoral competition might condition their support for voter ID bills, beyond their own party affiliation. Given that the controversial legislation may disproportionately
increase the costs of voting for racial and ethnic minorities and as not all state lawmakers face competition on Election Day, we are interested in the possibility of intraparty divisions in member support of the legislation, even in spite of intense partisan polarization. Furthermore, because of the enduring legacy of Jim Crow, with its raft of restrictive voting provisions (Key 1949; Kousser 1974) and the frequent comparisons made with contemporary restrictive voter ID laws, it is expected that the Democratic Party and its larger coalition of African American voters and black legislators in the American South should be most opposed to this restrictive voting reform. The politicization of voter ID laws only intensified following the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling in Shelby County v. Holder, which eliminated the Justice Department’s role of preclearing changes to election laws in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act. Following the decision, several commentators warned about the possible return of Jim Crow laws in the American South as state legislatures were once again unfettered in pursuing voting restrictions (Berman 2015; Jealous and Haygood 2014; Knafo 2013; Mock 2012; Siddharta 2011). We contend that an appreciation of this broader historical landscape is necessary to understand the more immediate district-level context that may influence a legislator’s voting behavior on restrictive voter ID bills.

Finally, although we are not the first to assess state legislator support for restrictive voter ID legislation (see McKee 2015), we provide the most comprehensive examination of this behavior by spanning the years 2005 to 2013, and we are therefore able to make more definitive statements regarding those factors that shape lawmaker voting on this issue. By engaging in a complete analysis of state legislator votes on all voter ID bills that passed both chambers of every statehouse over a 9-year period, the marked partisan polarization on this electoral reform makes it clear that contextual factors rarely impede on the overwhelming support Republican lawmakers give to this legislation. By comparison, arguably, the most interesting findings are tied to the considerable racial and regional variation in Democratic lawmakers’ support for restrictive voter ID laws.

Data

Similar to previous studies (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Hicks et al. 2015), we examine the passage stage of voter ID legislation. We do so for several reasons. First, because of the higher stakes, members are more likely to engage in sincere voting in instances when legislation passes rather than when it is merely proposed (Volden 1998). Second, like numerous congressional studies examining roll-call votes on bills that pass, we have an analogous sample of votes cast on a highly salient and uniform type of passed legislation (Ordeshook and Schwartz 1987). Third, it seems overly problematic and difficult to defend the compilation of legislator votes that were cast prior to the passage stage, especially as one moves backward to the earliest stages of the legislative process (e.g., a committee vote) when voter ID bills are often dead on arrival. Finally, our data set includes the universe of votes cast when (1) the legislation of interest passed both chambers of a state legislature and (2) the substance of the legislation clearly provides for a more strict set of guidelines for proving one’s identity
to vote in person (National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL] 2014). This final point sets the stage for the focus of this study: assessing the voting behavior of state legislators on restrictive voter ID bills that starkly divide the Democratic and Republican parties.

Figure 1 highlights the extent of partisan polarization where a state legislature approved a more restrictive voter ID law, approved placing such a measure before the electorate in the form of a referendum, or approved enabling legislation for a successful ballot initiative on the topic. For each state and corresponding year plotted from 2005 to 2013, Figure 1 offers a simple metric to gauge partisan polarization. We subtract the percentage of Democratic lawmakers voting “nay” from the percentage of Republicans voting “yea” and then subtract this difference from 100. For instance, in North Carolina in 2013, 100% of Democrats voted against a restrictive voter ID bill on the final floor vote, whereas 100% of Republicans voted in favor ([100] − [100% R-yea − 100% D-nay]); thus, there was 100% partisan polarization on the legislation.

As there is always a higher (or equal) percentage of Republicans favoring restrictive voter ID legislation than the corresponding percentage of Democrats opposing, it is not necessary to take the absolute value of this difference from 100. As such, Figure 1 reveals that for every state and accompanying year in our data set, Republican lawmakers were more supportive of restrictive voter ID legislation than Democratic lawmakers. Furthermore, with few exceptions—such as Idaho in 2010 and Missouri and Rhode Island in 2011—the polarization on floor votes in favor of restrictive voter ID laws is
Online Appendix Table A1 provides a more detailed look at the data set, including a brief synopsis of each bill and the percentage breakdown in support of the legislation by party affiliation and state legislative chamber. In all, our data set includes a total of 28 state/year dyads; six states make more than one appearance in the data set.8

There is considerable demographic compositional variation in the states displayed in Figure 1, but with respect to sectional representation, however, states from the Midwest and South are most prominent. States from these two regions are predominant because (1) the most electorally competitive states (in presidential, statewide, and state legislative elections) reside in the Midwest where frequent turnover of partisan control of state legislatures, especially after the 2010 midterm, enabled new Republican majorities to pass restrictive voter ID legislation and (2) the issue of race factors most heavily in the South, where even though Republicans are now in command of all state legislatures, this development is very recent, and as African American voters are a large segment of the electorate that aligns with the Democratic opposition, this is a compelling rationale for an almost entirely white Southern Grand Old Party (GOP) to pass restrictive voter ID laws.

Each restrictive voter ID bill in our data set received majority support in each chamber of these state legislatures. As we discuss below, we include bills creating either a “strict” photo or “nonstrict” voter ID requirement. It is important to note that not all the legislation we include in our data set went into effect. In some cases, the legislation may have been subsequently vetoed by the governor, not approved by the electorate (if it was a referendum placed on the ballot), or struck down by the courts. In all, our data set consists of 4,495 state legislative votes cast in favor or against a restrictive voter ID bill over the 9-year period; 65% of the floor votes were in favor of the legislation (SD = 0.477). As emphasized earlier, viewed in terms of party affiliation, the level of polarization is remarkable across the states and over the years: 97.5% of Republican legislators voted “yea” (SD = 0.153), whereas just 11% of Democratic legislators voted “yea” (SD = 0.317). The near consensus level of GOP support (and the smaller standard deviation) likely reflects the racial homogeneity of Republican lawmakers and their electorates, above and beyond any effort of coalition maintenance by the Republican Party (Hicks et al. 2015; Karol 2009).

In our multivariate models that follow, the dependent variable is coded 1 for a “yea” vote for a voter ID bill and 0 for a “nay” vote. With the state legislator as the unit of analysis, we first estimate a model that includes all the lawmakers in our data set. Then, we run models limited to Democratic legislators and Republican legislators, respectively. All of the independent variables are displayed in Table 1. The first six variables listed are district-level measures. Some of the summary statistics on these variables are quite revealing with respect to the differences among Democratic and Republican legislators’ districts. For instance, the median percent married in Democratic districts is 45 versus a considerably higher median of 56% married in Republican districts.

The most striking disparity, perhaps, are the racial differences among Democratic and Republican lawmakers. First, hardly any Republican legislators in the data set are extremely high. Online Appendix Table A1 provides a more detailed look at the data set, including a brief synopsis of each bill and the percentage breakdown in support of the legislation by party affiliation and state legislative chamber. In all, our data set includes a total of 28 state/year dyads; six states make more than one appearance in the data set.8
African American (less than 1%), whereas 25% of Democratic lawmakers are black. Second, at the district level, the median percent black population is 11 for Democratic legislators, almost 4 times the median percent for Republican lawmakers (3%). This notable difference displayed in Table 1 does not reveal the much more impressive difference in the median district percent black among Democratic legislators based on the lawmaker’s race. Since the Supreme Court’s *Thornburg v. Gingles* ruling in 1986, the marked increase in majority black districts speaks to the importance of descriptive representation, as most of these districts are won by African American Democrats (Lublin 1997).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Full [min, max]</th>
<th>DEMS [min, max]</th>
<th>REPS [min, max]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% black</td>
<td>5 [0, 97]</td>
<td>11 [0, 97]</td>
<td>3 [0, 57]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic</td>
<td>4 [0, 96]</td>
<td>4 [0, 96]</td>
<td>3 [0, 94]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-U.S. native</td>
<td>4 [0, 53]</td>
<td>5 [0, 53]</td>
<td>4 [0, 52]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% bachelors</td>
<td>23 [3, 82]</td>
<td>21 [3, 82]</td>
<td>24 [7, 75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% married</td>
<td>54 [10, 71]</td>
<td>45 [10, 68]</td>
<td>56 [10, 72]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino legislator</td>
<td>0 [2% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [3% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [&lt;1% = 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black legislator</td>
<td>0 [10% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [25% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [&lt;1% = 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female legislator</td>
<td>0 [21% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [31% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [15% = 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>0 [25% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [25% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [24% = 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict photo ID</td>
<td>1 [63% = 1]</td>
<td>1 [64% = 1]</td>
<td>1 [62% = 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOV</td>
<td>37 [0, 100]</td>
<td>40 [0, 100]</td>
<td>36 [0, 100]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0 [41% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [41% = 1]</td>
<td>0 [41% = 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEM</td>
<td>15 [0, 51]</td>
<td>15 [0, 51]</td>
<td>17 [0, 51]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>6 [0, 8]</td>
<td>6 [0, 8]</td>
<td>6 [0, 8]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The table displays median values with minimum and maximum values in brackets. For dummy variables, we include, in place of the minimum and maximum values, only the percentage of cases that equal 1. The number of Democratic and Republican lawmakers does not sum to 4,495 because there are 10 legislators not affiliated with the major parties. Values are rounded up to nearest whole number. DEMS = Democratic legislators; REPS = Republican legislators; MOV = margin of victory; PEM = partisan election margin.

In our sample, among nonblack Democratic legislators the median district percent black population is 5.5 (minimum = 0%, maximum = 72%), whereas the median district percent black for African American Democratic lawmakers is 58 (minimum = 0%, maximum = 97%). With regard to restrictive voter ID laws, there is good reason to suspect that racial differences across and within the party affiliation of state legislators may have a significant effect on legislative voting behavior. Furthermore, as there are more majority black districts and hence black legislators in the South, we expect that Southern black Democrats will be most opposed to restrictive voter ID legislation. To simplify the discussion of racial differences in the forthcoming analysis, “black”
refers to nonwhite and non-Hispanic legislators/constituencies, and “white” refers to nonblack and non-Hispanic legislators/constituencies. In the next section, we go into greater detail discussing the independent variables and their expected influence on state legislator voting on restrictive voter ID legislation.

**Expectations and Method**

Our hypotheses begin with two overriding assumptions regarding lawmakers’ perceptions of voter ID laws. First, lawmakers suspect that voter ID laws marginally undermine turnout among groups of citizens who typically vote for Democrats. If this is true and if politicians are interested in winning office, it would imply that Democrats, on average, should be more opposed to these laws than Republicans. Nevertheless, this assumption also implies that support or opposition for these laws depends on the potential strategic value of these laws *in context*. For example, even if a Democratic lawmaker believes that voter ID laws undermine turnout among black constituents, would he or she oppose these laws if they have an all-white constituency? We argue that, other things being equal, such a Democrat would be more likely to support restrictive voter ID laws than a Democrat with a constituency bifurcated between blacks and whites.

Second, lawmakers suspect that citizens typically favor voter ID laws. Voter ID laws have been successfully framed as devices that protect the integrity of the ballot box, even though more recent studies indicate some mass partisan polarization over the issue (Gronke et al. 2015; Wilson and Brewer 2013). This makes voting against these laws potentially more difficult than supporting them. This assumption also implies that Democrats are more likely to support voter ID laws than Republicans are to oppose them. Therefore, we expect that Democratic voting records on strict voter ID laws are significantly more variable than Republican voting records on such legislation. Indeed, we expect that context has a much larger bearing on Democratic vis-à-vis Republican votes.

With the aforementioned party-based expectations laid out, electoral competition is another closely related factor that we expect to influence lawmaker support of restrictive voter ID laws. Following aggregate-level studies, we also expect legislator support of this polarizing issue to be contingent on statewide partisan competition (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Hicks et al. 2015), with Republican lawmakers in electorally competitive states more likely to support voter ID laws than Republicans in electorally uncompetitive states and Democrats in electorally competitive states less likely to support voter ID laws than Democrats in electorally uncompetitive states. We measure the competitiveness of a state with the partisan election margin (PEM). This variable reflects, *across all legislative districts*, the margin by which one party “beat” the other party in the most recent election.9

Electoral context may work in more than one way. As noted above, the overall competitiveness of elections *across* legislative districts may compel legislators to support such laws in an effort to achieve or protect majority status in the legislature. But legislators’ personal, prior electoral experience may compel them to support or oppose a voter ID law. Because voter ID laws are perceived as beneficial to Republicans and
detrimental to Democratic turnout (Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2008; Vercellotti and Andersen 2009; but see Mycoff, Wagner, and Wilson 2009), Republican members elected in competitive races are likely more supportive of the legislation than Republicans elected in noncompetitive contests. We use lawmakers’ most recent, prior margin of victory (MOV) to capture this relationship.10

We also think a district demographic—specifically, the percentage of the black population—might shape lawmakers’ votes on voter ID laws. Knowing that black turnout typically benefits Democratic candidates, we argue that the black district population exhibits opposing effects on Republican and Democratic lawmakers. Specifically, we argue that it should negatively affect the probability a Democratic lawmaker votes “yea,” whereas it should positively affect the probability a Republican lawmaker votes “yea.” We think the overwhelmingly one-sided support that African Americans give to Democratic candidates should register in the behavior of state lawmakers on the starkly polarized issue of voter ID laws (McKee 2015).

Finally, we expect there to be a notable relationship between support for voter ID laws and the party, race, and region of a legislator. As discussed, Democrats should be much more opposed to this restrictive voting reform compared with Republicans, but we also expect that within the Democratic Party, Southern lawmakers and black legislators more than any other group should vote against restrictive voter ID bills.11 Given the South’s history of contentious black voter suppression measures and heightened racial tensions (Key 1949; Keyssar 2009; Kousser 1974), we argue that a lawmaker’s race and region interact in shaping his or her vote on a voter ID law. In particular, black Democratic lawmakers who represent legislative districts in Southern states are likely to be uniquely opposed to these laws. And because African Americans constitute a greater share of the Democratic coalition in Southern states, we expect Democratic lawmakers in these states will especially oppose voter ID bills. We test these expectations by first including separate indicators for South and black legislator and then interacting our South indicator with our black legislator indicator.12

We fit a multilevel model to these data, conceiving of districts, $j$, as nested within states, $i$. Using this approach, we empirically distinguish between state-level variables and district-level variables. Our formal model, combining a state-level equation and a district-level equation, is as follows:

$$ y_{ij} = \logit^{-1} \left( \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \%Black_{ij} + \beta_2 \cdot \%Hispanic_{ij} + \beta_3 \cdot \%Non-U.S._\text{Native}_{ij} + \beta_4 \cdot \%BachelorsPlus_{ij} + \beta_5 \cdot \%Married_{ij} + \beta_6 \cdot \%Over65_{ij} + \beta_7 \cdot \text{LatinoLegislator}_{ij} + \beta_8 \cdot \text{BlackLegislator}_{ij} + \beta_9 \cdot \text{South}_{i} + \beta_{10} \cdot \text{BlackLegislator}_{ij} \times \text{South}_{i} + \beta_{11} \cdot \text{FemaleLegislator}_{ij} + \beta_{12} \cdot \text{Senator}_{ij} + \beta_{13} \cdot \text{MOV}_{ij} + \beta_{14} \cdot \text{PEM}_{i} + \beta_{15} \cdot \text{Strict_Photo_ID}_{j} + \beta_{16} \cdot Time_{i} + \zeta_{0i} + \epsilon_{ij} \right). $$

With the outcome, $y$, operationalized as the likelihood a legislator votes “yea” on a voter ID bill versus the likelihood that he or she votes “nay,” we use a multilevel logit model.13 This outcome is measured with reference to all legislators’ votes on voter ID
bills in our sample of states that have passed a restrictive voter ID law from 2005 to 2013. Importantly, we segment the residual variation in lawmakers’ voting behavior between states, $\zeta_{0i}$, and between legislators in the same state, $\varepsilon_{ij}$. This model contains district-specific variables describing the demographic composition of each district, the race/ethnicity, and gender of lawmakers representing each district; a dummy variable denoting if the lawmaker is a senator; and a variable describing the electoral competitiveness of each district (MOV). It also includes state-specific variables describing the electoral competitiveness of each state (PEM), the region of each state, and a variable for time. We use a time-counter variable that codes all legislative votes occurring in state $i$ in 2005 as 0 and counts up by 1 each year thereafter until 2013.14 Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating if a bill in a given year would have created a “strict” photo or “nonstrict” photo voter ID requirement.15

We include a variable that separates legislators by gender as well as several variables that describe the demographic characteristics of legislators’ districts as a set of control variables (the percentage of a district’s population that is more than age 65, married, non-U.S. native, and has a bachelor’s degree or more). Because women are a core component of the Democratic Party and as a group have a history of electoral disenfranchisement, it is possible that women, and particularly Democratic women, are more opposed to voter ID laws than men. For similar reasons stemming directly from what we know about the compositional makeup of the coalitions aligned with the major parties, it is also possible that the size of the college-educated population, the married population, the population more than 65 years of age, and the size of the non-U.S. native population have opposing effects on Republican and Democratic lawmakers’ votes on voter ID bills (McKee 2015).

Results

Our core findings are presented below in Table 2. Our estimates include the full model with both Democratic and Republican lawmakers. This model separates Republican lawmakers with a dummy variable. We then display estimates for just Democratic legislators and finally estimates for a model including only Republican lawmakers.16 Table 2 also contains ancillary columns denoted as “PR($\Delta$)%.” Each of the quantities in these columns represents the percentage point change in the population-averaged probability that a legislator votes “yea” on a stricter voter ID bill if the variable to its left is changed from its observed minimum value to its observed maximum value, with all other quantitative variables held to their respective mean values and qualitative variables held to their modal values. We only provide this quantity for variables that reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In line with our hypotheses, we discuss the results of the analysis in three sections: (1) party and competition, (2) black district population, and (3) party, region, and legislator race.

Party and Competition

We start with the most important determinant of state legislator voting on restrictive voter ID laws: legislator party affiliation. In the full model, Republicans are more
than 900 times more likely to vote “yea” on voter ID bills, *ceteris paribus*. The probability that a Republican votes “yea” is greater by 75.35 percentage points relative to a Democrat, other variables held constant. Our database contains 2,791 Republicans, 1,694 Democrats, and 10 independent/third-party members who voted either “yea” or “nay” on these laws. Only 67 Republicans voted “nay,” whereas 192 Democrats voted “yea.” The party polarization among state lawmakers on restrictive voter ID bills is stark.

The competitive context of a state appears to drive lawmakers’ support or opposition to voter ID laws in the full model and in the Democrats-only model. Competition registers at a more macro- than microlevel, as the PEM is highly significant but MOV is not. In the Democratic model, the odds that a Democrat votes “yea” nearly triple per 10-unit increase in a state’s most recent, prior PEM. This means that Democratic legislators in less competitive states are more likely to vote “yea,” and consequently, Democrats in more competitive states are more likely to vote “nay.” Notably, the probability that a Democrat in the least electorally competitive state votes “yea” is higher by 55.58 percentage points than a Democrat in the most electorally competitive state, other variables set to their respective means and modes. We fail to find evidence, however, that the PEM drives Republican legislators’ votes on the issue. We also find no evidence that electoral competition at the *district level* matters for either Republican or Democratic lawmakers. This provides some evidence that support for these laws may be aimed primarily at protecting or achieving majority status, rather than safeguarding incumbency itself.

**Black District Population**

With only Democrats included in the model, the second column of coefficients indicates that a Democratic legislator representing the Democratic district with the largest black population is significantly less likely to vote “yea” on a voter ID bill than a Democrat representing the Democratic district with the smallest black population. The former, in fact, is 17.88 percentage points less likely to vote “yea” on a voter ID law than the latter. This finding contrasts with the positive and weakly significant coefficient for this variable in the Republican-only sample, presented in the third column of coefficients. This model reveals that Republicans elected in districts with relatively larger black populations are marginally more likely to vote “yea” than their copartisans who represent districts with smaller black populations.

Based on the models presented in Table 2, we plot the opposing effects of the size of the black population on Republican and Democratic legislators in Figure 2. This figure provides three insights into legislators’ support for voter ID laws. First, holding other variables at their median values, it shows that Republican and Democratic lawmakers are remarkably polarized in their support for these laws. Regardless of the size of the black population, the median Democrat likely opposes such legislation and the median Republican likely supports it. Second, it shows that the distance between the median Democrat and the median Republican grows as the size of the black constituency they represent increases. Because the largest black population for a Republican lawmaker is 57%, we stop the line there for Republican legislators. Finally, Figure 2
Table 2. Likelihood that State Legislator Votes “Yea” on Voter ID Bill.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Full PR(Δ)%</th>
<th>DEMS PR(Δ)%</th>
<th>REPS PR(Δ)%</th>
<th>PR(Δ)%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>6.8160**</td>
<td>75.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.2369)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% black</td>
<td>−0.0181*</td>
<td>−13.5</td>
<td>−0.0314**</td>
<td>−17.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0092)</td>
<td>(0.0113)</td>
<td>(0.0306)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic</td>
<td>−0.0225</td>
<td>−0.0131</td>
<td>−0.0286</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0172)</td>
<td>(0.0232)</td>
<td>(0.0345)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% non-U.S. native</td>
<td>0.0116</td>
<td>−0.0130</td>
<td>0.0920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0224)</td>
<td>(0.0302)</td>
<td>(0.0559)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% bachelors</td>
<td>−0.0161†</td>
<td>−11.17</td>
<td>−0.0230*</td>
<td>−12.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0070)</td>
<td>(0.0101)</td>
<td>(0.0125)</td>
<td>−0.0124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% married</td>
<td>0.0107</td>
<td>−0.0103</td>
<td>0.0422*</td>
<td>11.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0118)</td>
<td>(0.0157)</td>
<td>(0.0190)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% more than age 65</td>
<td>−0.0107</td>
<td>−0.0182</td>
<td>0.0419</td>
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<td>(0.0260)</td>
<td>(0.0393)</td>
<td>(0.0390)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino legislator</td>
<td>−0.8031</td>
<td>−0.9243</td>
<td>−0.4392</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.6133)</td>
<td>(0.7689)</td>
<td>(1.1591)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black legislator</td>
<td>0.6508</td>
<td>0.7953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5102)</td>
<td>(0.5694)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>−1.4487*</td>
<td>−10.73</td>
<td>−1.5109†</td>
<td>−8.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.6474)</td>
<td>(0.8202)</td>
<td>(0.8846)</td>
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<tr>
<td>South × black</td>
<td>−4.1952**</td>
<td>−25.48</td>
<td>−4.5398**</td>
<td>−21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.8866)</td>
<td>(1.1608)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.1083</td>
<td>−0.3361</td>
<td>−0.1206</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.1878)</td>
<td>(0.2492)</td>
<td>(0.3454)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>−0.3202†</td>
<td>−2.93</td>
<td>−0.6498*</td>
<td>−4.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.1830)</td>
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<td>MOV</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.0024)</td>
<td>(0.0033)</td>
<td>(0.0041)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEM</td>
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<td>47.5</td>
<td>0.1057**</td>
<td>55.58</td>
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<td>(0.0226)</td>
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<td>(0.0411)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strict photo ID</td>
<td>−2.0944**</td>
<td>−26.47</td>
<td>−1.3064</td>
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<td>(0.5862)</td>
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<td>(0.7046)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>0.5005**</td>
<td>16.27</td>
<td>0.3734*</td>
<td>11.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.1188)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−4.5032</td>
<td>−3.4857</td>
<td>0.1840</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.0194)</td>
<td>(1.2919)</td>
<td>(1.4232)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ζoi</td>
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<td>1.4398</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>1.694</td>
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<td>703.074</td>
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<td>BIC</td>
<td>1,526.453</td>
<td>800.901</td>
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</table>

Note. Multilevel logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. PR(Δ)% denotes the percentage change (±) in the population-averaged probability that a legislator votes “yea” if the covariate changes from its maximum value to its minimum value (e.g., Republicans are 75.35% more likely to vote “yea” than Democrats). Bolded quantities in the row beginning with “South” represent the difference in probabilities for a white Southern Democrat versus a white Democrat from outside the South. Bolded quantities in the row beginning with “South × black” represent the difference in probabilities for a black Southern Democrat versus a black Democrat from outside the South. The dependent variable equals 1 for a “yea” vote on a voter ID bill, and 0 equals a “nay” vote on a voter ID bill. ID = identification; DEMS = Democratic legislators; REPS = Republican legislators; MOV = margin of victory; PEM = partisan election margin; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.

†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01 (two-tailed).
reveals that Republican voting records on voter ID laws are noticeably more homogeneous than Democratic voting records. Democrats’ votes vary more than their Republican colleagues across this variable and most of the other variables in our models. Hence, this asymmetric partisan polarization means that we are able to learn more about the systematic sources of legislator support for or against voter ID laws by analyzing Democratic lawmakers in particular.18

**Party, Region, and Legislator Race**

The bolded numbers that are aligned next to the “South” variable in Table 2 represent the difference in probabilities that a white Democratic lawmaker from the South votes “yea” versus a white Democratic lawmaker from outside the South doing so.19 The bolded numbers aligned next to “South × black” represent the difference in probabilities that a black Democratic lawmaker from the South votes “yea” versus a black Democratic lawmaker from outside the South voting in favor of the legislation. Hence, we present evidence that race and region interact in shaping lawmakers’ votes, at least among Democrats.20

These models reveal that black and white Democratic lawmakers vote differently on voter ID laws depending on whether or not they represent districts in Southern states. The *marginal effect* of the logged odds ratio for the black lawmaker variable further reveals that the difference between black and white lawmakers’ votes on these bills is only statistically significant for Southern lawmakers.21 According to the full model, for example, the odds that a black lawmaker in the South votes “yea” on a voter
ID law are lower by a factor of 0.03, or 97%, with a 90% confidence interval spanning from 0.007 to 0.112. Furthermore, the population-averaged probability that a white Democratic lawmaker in a Southern state votes “yea” on a voter ID law is just below 8%, whereas the population-averaged probability that a black Democratic lawmaker in a Southern state votes “yea” is below 1%.22

The Democratic-only model demonstrates a similar relationship in a sample that includes only these partisans. The marginal effect of the black lawmaker variable, again, only reaches statistical significance for lawmakers in the South. Put differently, we find that voting varies between black and white lawmakers, but only among Southern legislators. According to this model, the odds that a black lawmaker in the South votes “yea” on a voter ID law are lower by a factor of 0.02, or 98%, with a 90% confidence interval spanning from 0.004 to 0.151. This model further demonstrates that the population-averaged probability a white Democratic lawmaker in a Southern state votes “yea” on a voter ID law is just below 6%. The population-averaged probability that a black Democratic lawmaker in a Southern state votes “yea” is below 1%. The findings from both models support our contention that Southern governments’ use of electoral institutions to dampen black turnout in the past likely shape current black Democratic lawmakers’ perception of voter ID laws, leading them to vote differently from their white Democratic colleagues in the South.

The interaction effect also reveals that the marginal effect of region depends on legislators’ race. For example, the full model shows that although Southern Democrats are more likely to oppose voter ID laws relative to their non-South colleagues, the influence of region is stronger for black lawmakers. The population-averaged probabilities in Table 2 help demonstrate this fact. The probability that a white Democrat who represents a Southern district votes “yea” on a voter ID bill is lower by 10.73 percentage points relative to a white Democrat who represents a district outside the South. On the contrary, the probability that a black Democrat who represents a Southern district votes “yea” is lower by 25.48 percentage points relative to a black Democrat who represents a non-Southern district. We come to the same conclusion in reference to the Democratic-only model in the second column of coefficients: Democratic lawmakers’ region shapes their votes on voter ID bills, but its influence is much stronger for black lawmakers.23 Our evidence—that black Democratic lawmakers in the South are uniquely opposed to voter ID laws—supports our contention that their perceptions of these measures are shaped by the historical legacy and context of a markedly more restrictive participatory environment notorious for its raft of disenfranchising devices employed during the Jim Crow past.24

**Conclusion**

Despite massive partisan polarization over restrictive voter ID laws in state legislatures—with more than 97% of Republicans voting “yea” and more than 88% of Democrats voting “nay”—we still find several factors beyond party affiliation influence the propensity of lawmakers to vote for or against such measures. These factors, such as region (South), the black district population, region interacted with a legislator’s race,
and electoral margin, all have a significant effect on the likelihood a state lawmaker supports voter ID legislation. And not surprisingly, these factors are associated with the coalitional bases of the major parties (Karol 2009) as well as rooted in party competition (Hicks et al. 2015). Finally, in the case of our models confined to just one party, the greater diversity of Democratic legislators is reflected in the wider variation of their support for voter ID laws, whereas the virtually lockstep backing of Republicans for this electoral reform naturally closes off the possibility for other factors to register substantial effects on their voting behavior.

The findings from this study are particularly important because most of the prominent research on this topic is done at the macrolevel, with the state legislature serving as the unit of analysis. By assessing which factors influence support for restrictive voter ID bills with the state legislator as the unit of analysis, we are able to home in on factors tied more directly to the electoral connection. For example, extant macrolevel studies of state legislatures have produced mixed findings with regard to the role of race in influencing support for restrictive voter ID bills. Bentele and O’Brien (2013) found that African American populations influence passage of restrictive voter ID measures, whereas Rocha and Matsubayashi (2014) and Hicks et al. (2015) produced null results. To be sure, the modeling choices in these studies are somewhat different, which might affect the results. Nonetheless, these state-level approaches cannot capture the more immediate factors impinging on state legislator voting behavior.

In addition, looking at the microlevel enables us to tease out several interesting nuances in lawmaker voting behavior. For example, holding constant the amount of competition legislators faced in their own prior elections, we find that Democrats elected in states with more electoral competition across districts (i.e., meaning that a party’s majority status is more vulnerable) are more opposed to these laws than Democrats elected in electorally uncompetitive states. This finding supports our theoretical assumptions: Democratic lawmakers suspect that these laws undermine turnout among likely Democratic voters but assume that public opinion favors them, thus compelling them to vote “nay” when it may cost their party the majority. At the same time, it also reveals that lawmakers may be willing to support the interests of their party even if it may put them at greater electoral risk. Looking at general roll-call records, Carroll and Eichorst (2013) found evidence for this argument, too. We encourage future researchers to theoretically and empirically evaluate this phenomenon. For example, how much risk do lawmakers actually face under these kinds of conditions? And how much risk is acceptable for lawmakers to put the interest of the party above their own?

Finally, we would be remiss if we did not speculate as to whether or not the support for restrictive voter ID laws by state lawmakers informs the larger discussion of descriptive versus substantive representation, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Shelby County v. Holder. With its ruling that Congress’ coverage formula undergirding Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional, several Republican-controlled state legislatures—particularly those in the South—have even more aggressively pursued legislation curtailing voting rights that previously the U.S. Department of Justice would have had to preclear. Our finding that in
the South the level of support for restrictive voter ID laws was notably higher among white Democratic lawmakers than black Democratic lawmakers raises some concerns over whether substantive representation is effective or whether descriptive representation continues to drive legislative support on divisive issues such as voting rights. Some white Democratic lawmakers in the South appear not only to be discounting the principled preservation of voting rights but their support for more restrictive voter ID laws may also be undermining their own party’s ability to maintain their coalition in future elections.

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Notes

1. The anomalous case of Rhode Island is rooted in the “intraminority competition” prevalent within the dominant Democratic Party (see Filindra and Orr 2013). And in the case of a voter identification (ID) law, it appears that many Anglo Democratic legislators supported the measure as a means to tamp down the threat of a minority Democratic challenger in districts with significant minority (black and Latino) populations.

2. A more recent survey shows considerable differences in support for voter ID laws according to partisanship: favored by 62% of Democrats, 82% of Independents, and 94% of Republicans (Wilson and Brewer 2013, 972). Gronke et al. (2015) also found significant partisan differences in support of voter ID laws based on survey questions placed on modules of the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. These studies demonstrate that the mass public is becoming more polarized on the issue of voter ID laws, particularly with respect to partisanship.

3. In this study, our discussion and measurement of the American South includes the 11 former Confederate states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

4. In addition to analyses conducted on passage of voter ID laws, Bentele and O’Brien (2013) and Hicks et al. (2015) included analyses conducted at the proposal stage.

5. Because the politics of voter ID laws are not only polarizing but also salient, we think there is good reason to assume that state lawmakers are likely to vote sincerely—not strategically—in support or opposition of legislation raising the threshold of acceptable ID needed to vote at the polls. Although taking into consideration the preferences of their constituencies, Republican and Democratic legislators are likely to support their party’s most-preferred position (see Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Bafumi and Herron
We largely discount the possibility that state lawmakers voting on the issue are principally motivated by legislative logrolling or rent-seeking behavior (Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Rather, we expect party cohesion to be quite strong, in keeping with aggregate-level studies showing chamber votes on voter ID bills to be of the party-line variety (e.g., Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Hicks et al. 2015). Our analysis draws on the final floor vote of each chamber and excludes lawmakers who abstained, voted present, were excused, or were absent during the roll call. As voter ID is such a polarizing issue, we exclude these categories from our analysis because we cannot assume these “nonvotes” to be random, nor can we assume them to reflect lawmakers’ intentional avoidance of taking a position on the legislation (Cohen and Noll 1991).

Empirical studies assessing the voting behavior of members of Congress tend to be limited in terms of their generalizability to members of Congress alone. Likewise, our findings are similarly limited to legislators’ behavior in the 22 state legislatures that approved a stricter version of a voter ID law from 2005 to 2013.

Likewise, in every chamber (House and Senate) in every state, Republicans were more supportive than Democrats in passing restrictive voter ID legislation.


It is measured as the absolute value of the percentage of Democratic votes minus the percentage of Republican votes across all state legislative elections. Higher values mean a less competitive environment. These data are derived from Klarner et al. (2013). The data through 2012 are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/cKlarner.

We construct this variable using Berry, Berkman, and Schniederman’s (2000) measure for margin of victory (MOV). It identifies the electoral context of a particular district. Our data for this variable are derived from Klarner et al. (2013).

We collected racial/ethnic data on state legislators from two primary sources: the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies data on black elected officials (BEOs) and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO). The first data source, which we use to create the dummy indicator for an African American legislator, was utilized for most of the Southern legislators included in the analyses. For the rest of the cases, we relied on a comprehensive online search of legislators to determine whether they were African American. By contrast, the NALEO data, which we consulted for constructing the dummy variable for Hispanic legislators, are complete for the entire timespan of our data set. To determine the gender of lawmakers, we took inventory of every single state legislative chamber (and corresponding year), and after coding women 1 and men 0, we compared the state totals for female lawmakers against those made available online through the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University. See http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/resources/FactSheetArchive.php#stateleg.

We also included interaction terms between legislators’ race and racial characteristics of their districts. However, we found no evidence that these interaction terms matter, nor did they substantively alter the coefficients of other parameters in the models. Because of their insignificance as well as the additional interpretive cost of including these interaction terms in these models, we dropped them from the analyses.

In the following analysis, we fit this model to split samples of only Republican and Democratic lawmakers. Only 2.4% of Republicans voted “nay” on voter ID laws. The rarity of a “nay” vote introduces some bias into coefficients derived from a multilevel logit. Therefore, we also used Firth’s (1993) penalized maximum likelihood estimation to fit this model to the Republican-only sample, including bootstrapped standard errors clustered
to the state (100 repetitions). Although we find weak evidence below that the size of the black population shapes Republicans’ votes on voter ID laws, this model reveals a slightly weaker relationship—that is, the coefficient loses its statistical significance. However, because we model legislative votes specific to particular bills, in particular states, we prefer the multilevel logit model over this rare events model as it better approximates the data generation process. Furthermore, other differences in coefficients between the two models are expected and trivial, supporting our general conclusions.

14. We include a time-counter variable for two reasons. First, partisan polarization on the issue may have changed with respect to time. Second, because in a very small number of cases a legislature voted on a more restrictive voter ID bill twice, our coefficients could be marginally biased by autocorrelation. Treating time as a linear effect provides a better fit to these data than other alternatives (e.g., treating time with a random coefficient, with fixed dummy variables for each year, or using advanced polynomials).

15. Drawing on the classification scheme established by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), we code a bill as strict photo ID if it forces voters failing to produce a valid photo ID to cast a provisional ballot, which will only be accepted if the voter subsequently furnishes a valid photo ID to a local elections supervisor. See the NCSL’s strict and nonstrict photo ID legislation classification: http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx.

16. An alternative to this approach of running three models (full, Democrat, and Republican) is to interact the Republican dummy variable with all other independent variables. We present our findings this way for two reasons. First, the interaction model fails to provide any new information beyond our findings with split samples. Second, this approach facilitates interpretation of the coefficients. In addition, with a likelihood-ratio (LR) test—LR, $\chi^2(14) = 48.69, p < .001$ —and a Wald test—LR, $\chi^2(14) = 48.69, p < .001$, $\chi^2(14) = 47.86, p < .001$ —we reject the hypothesis that the coefficients in the first column are jointly equal between Republicans and Democrats.

17. Population-averaged probabilities incorporate the random intercepts by averaging the subject-specific probabilities over the distribution of the random intercepts via integration. Subject-specific probabilities are typically more extreme.

18. With respect to other district-level demographic factors, we fail to find evidence that the size of the Latino population or the non-U.S. native population influence Democrats’ or Republicans’ votes on voter ID laws. We do find that the size of the population with at least a bachelor’s degree negatively affects the probability that a Democrat votes “yea.” A Democrat representing the district with the most college graduates is 11.17 percentage points less likely to vote “yea” than the Democrat representing the least college-educated constituency. We find similar effects if we exchange this education variable with a variable for a district’s median income. We chose not to include a median income variable because it is highly correlated with the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree or more. Although Republican votes, on the contrary, appear unaffected by size of the college-educated population, we find the percentage of the married population in a member’s district drives Republican lawmakers’ support for voter ID legislation. The odds that a Republican votes “yea” increase by a factor of 1.53, or 53% per 10–percentage point increase in a district’s married population.

19. As we note above, using the term white as our reference is imperfect, as the true reference for these dummy variables includes all legislators who are neither black nor Hispanic. Nonetheless, it is a fairly safe assumption that the overwhelming majority of non-black and non-Hispanic state legislators are white.
20. We were unable to include the black legislator indicator, and, therefore, also its interaction with the South indicator, in the Republican-only model. Our data set includes only three black Republicans who voted on restrictive voter ID bills, and they all voted “yea.”
21. To calculate the following marginal effects and their accompanying 90% confidence intervals, we use the procedures specified by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). We take the exponential of the values we retrieve to convert logged odds to odds ratios.
22. We constrain all quantitative predictors to the mean value as well as all qualitative predictors to the modal values.
23. In the Democratic-only model, we also find that chamber influences support for stricter voter ID laws. Democrats serving in the Senate are less likely to support restrictive voter ID bills relative to Democrats serving in the lower chamber. This provides some evidence in favor of the notion that larger and more diverse districts may reduce legislators’ support for these laws. However, senators and house members are indistinguishable in the Republican-only model. Finally, we find evidence that time influences legislators’ votes on restrictive voter ID bills. Between 2005 and 2013, both Republicans and Democrats steadily became more and more likely to vote “yea.” We suspect that a partial explanation for this effect is that absent any contrary framing, public support for voter ID laws suggests that it is a valence issue as a protection against fraud. It is important to note that the effect of time on Republican legislators’ support for voter ID legislation is smaller. This is because there was less room for change in this direction for Republicans—in effect, Republicans lawmakers were generally supportive of voter ID laws in 2005 but became even more supportive by 2013.
24. For instance, former National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) president Benjamin Jealous has called restrictive voter ID laws and other voting restrictions as “the greatest attacks on voting rights since segregation” (see Berman 2015, 11).

Supplement Material
The online appendices are available at http://sppq.sagepub.com/supplemental.

References


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