Probably my final attempt to sort out the empty higher-order representation problem and nonrelational HO theory. Supersedes some, but not all, of [8] and [2]. Co-authored with Jake Berger.

Looks at historical precautionary standards for attributing sentience to nonhumans, and suggests some revisions to a recent precautionary framework from Birch et al. Co-authored with Bob Fischer, Meghan Barrett, and Alex Schnell. [Journal]

Explores the marker methodology to studying nonhuman consciousness, focusing on unlimited associative learning as a potential marker. Argues that such a marker is not intensionally ecumenical. [Journal]

How do you count conscious subjects if conscious subjects can stand in a greater than 1:1 relation with whole animals? This paper explores two approaches, using the octopus as a case study. Co-authored with Bob Fischer. [Journal]

Suppose panpsychism is true. Then what? Not much-at least practically. Part of a long-term project at the intersection of mind and value theory. See also [UR1] and [UR2]. Co-authored with Bob Fischer. [Journal]

Offers a new, common-factor, representationalist theory of visual experience. A surprising result: in total hallucination, we experience (though do not see) scenes in non-actual possible worlds. Co-authored with Ed Averill. [Journal]

Exactly what the title says. Co-authored with Saja Parvizian. [Journal]

Hume famously pointed out that the self is elusive. This observation is true, but it is nonetheless consistent with us having self-experiences. This paper explains how. [Journal]

Does not answer the titular question, but provides a framework for doing so, focusing on longtermist themes. Companion to [11] and [7]. [Journal]

Formulates an alternative to traditional (non relational) HOT theory by arguing that the higher-order representations that constitute consciousness are cartographically formatted. This paper supersedes [1]. [Journal]

According to animalism, you can persist--survive over time--without being a person. But animalism is false. Is there another way to persist without being a person? Yes. [Journal]

Considers how temporal discounting and buck-passing adversely impacts existential risk mitigations efforts, using space colonization is a special case. [Journal]

Explores property representationalism, undoing some common confusions. Co-authored with Ali Rezaei. Connection to [17]: whereas this paper (towards the end) discussed general phenomenal particularity, [17] discussed specific phenomenal particularity. [Journal]. Typesetting was a fiasco. See [here] for some corrections.

It is often said that perceptual experience is transparent, and that this fact (if it is a fact) is revealing for theories of perceptual experience. This paper argues otherwise, and suggests instead that, if anything, transparency tells us more about the nature of what we experience, not experiences themselves. Co-authored with Ed Averill. [Journal]

The possibility of `empty' higher-order representations is a feature, not a bug, of higher-order theories. But it does require us to take extra care when attempting to set these theories out. [Journal]

Harm to extraterrestrial environments is not a good reason to not pursue large-scale space colonization. Companion to [18] and [15]. [Journal]

Many, though not all, first-order theories of consciousness `collapse' into higher-order theories. Hence, we should adopt some form of higher-order theory. [Journal]

What does hyperthymesia and prodigious visual memory in savant syndrome tell us about consciousness? The answer: that intermodal representationalism is likely false. [Journal]

A main fault line the debate over the difference between conscious and nonconscious mental states is between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. This paper argues that this dispute is verbal (though still substantive for meta-linguistic reasons). This was fun while it lasted, but I no longer endorse this position. For a discussion at the [Brains] blog, and my take on why the argument fails, see [here]. For discussion of issues related to the failure point, see [17] and [10]. [Journal]

Descartes was an imperativist about bodily sensations like pain. This solves a bunch of problems. Co-authored with Saja Parvizian. [Journal]

Two truisms about conscious visual states is that when we are in them, we only seem to be aware of our environment (they are 'transparent'), and to be conscious, we have be in some way aware of them (`transitivity'). Prima facie, we have a straightforward conflict. This paper attempts to work out whether there is a precisification of either claim that is compatible with each other, while retaining their original philosophical interest. [Journal]

Argues that nonrelational HOT theory has a problem accounting for visual phenomenal character. Superseded by [13]. [Journal]

Welfare subjects differ in terms of their welfare capacities. Why? This paper offers a positive view, picking up where [UR3] lets off: the capacity for first-person de se thought plays a crucial role.

Argues against phenomenalism about welfare subjectivity and welfare differences, setting the stage for a view where it is the possession of mentality, be it a conscious or not, that grounds welfare subjectivity and welfare differences. Co-authored with Jake Berger and Bob Fischer. Companion to [UR1].

Do LLMs think? This paper argues that, if they think at all, they likely think in purely associative terms. Co-authored with Ethan Kemp and Matt Trager.

Hedonistic goods swamp. Co-authored with Bob Fischer.

What kind of political system should be employed in early large-scale space colonies? Give epistocracy a try.